**References listed in the sequence they are mentioned in the presentation**

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Bloch, F. (2003), Non-cooperative Models of Coalition Formation in Games with Spillovers. In: Carraro, C. (ed.), The Endogenous Formation of Economic Coalitions. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK et al., ch. 2, pp. 35-79.

Yi, S.-S. (1997), Stable Coalition Structures with Externalities. “Games and Economic Behavior”, vol. 20(2), pp. 201-237.

Yi, S.-S. (2003), Endogenous Formation of Economic Coalitions: A Survey of the Partition Function Approach. In: Carraro, C. (ed.), The Endogenous Formation of Economic Coalitions. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK et al., ch. 3, pp. 80-127.

**Further Reading**

Asheim, G.B., C.B. Froyn, J. Hovi and F.C. Menz (2006), Regional versus Global Cooperation for Climate Control. “Journal of Environmental Economics and Management”, vol. 51(1), pp. 93-109. **Remark:** Repeated Game (Compliance Model) with multiple coalitions.

Barrett, S. (2003), Environment and Statecraft: The Strategy of Environmental Treaty-making. Oxford University Press, New York. **Remark:** A lot of information about international environmental treaties and basic game theory.

Barrett, S. (2006), Climate Treaties and “Breakthrough” Technologies. “American Economic Review”, vol. 96(2), pp. 22-25. **Remark:** Looks at the possibility whether an agreement on sharing efforts in R&D-investment achieves more than an environmental treaty.

Caparrós, A., J.-C. Péreau and T. Tazdaït (2004), North-South Climate Change Negotiations: A Sequential Game with Asymmetric Information. “Public Choice”, vol. 121(3-4), pp. 455-480. **Remark:** Models negotiations among a group of countries.

Diamantoudi, E. and E.S. Sartzetakis (2006), Stable International Environmental Agreements: An Analytical Approach. “Journal of Public Economic Theory”, vol. 8(2), pp. 247-263. **Remark:** Further development of Barrett (1994).

Eyckmans, J., M.Finus and L. Mallozzi (2012), A New Class of Welfare Maximizing Sharing Rules for Partition Function Games with Externalities, Bath Economics Research Paper 6-2012**. Remark:**  An optimal transfer scheme is developed.

Finus, M. and S. Maus (2008), Modesty May Pay! “Journal of Public Economic Theory”, vol. 10(5), pp. 801-826. **Remark**: Analyzes whether less ambitious abatement targets may buy more participation and whether this pays globally.

Finus, M. and P. Pintassilgo (2012), International Environmental Agreements under Uncertainty: Does the Veil of Uncertainty Help? Oxford Economic Papers, vol. 64, pp. 736-764. **Remark:** Looks at the effect of uncertain parameter values of the payoff function of players for the success of coalition formation.

Finus, M. and D.T.G. Rübbelke (2013), Coalition Formation and the Ancillary Benefits of Climate Policy. Forthcoming Environmental and Resource Economics. **Remark:** Analyzes whether ancillary benefits (also called co-benefits) lead to better outcomes in coalition formation.

Finus, M. and B. Rundshagen (2006), Participation in International Environmental Agreements: The Role of Timing and Regulation. Natural Resource Modeling, vol. 19, 2006, pp. 165-200. **Remark:** Analzes a sequential coalition formation process and contrasts it with a simultaneous process.

Lange, A. and C. Vogt (2003), Cooperation in International Environmental Negotiations due to a Preference for Equity. “Journal of Public Economics”, vol. 87(9-10), pp. 2049-2067. **Remark:** Sophisticated way to model non-material payoffs in coalition formation.

Montet, C. and D. Serra (2003), Game Theory & Economics. Palgrave Macmillan, Houndmills, UK. **Remark:** Only game theory book I know that covers IEAs and non-cooperative coalition theory.

P. Pintassilgo, M. Finus, M. Lindroos and G. Munro (2010), Stability and Success of Regional Fisheries Management Organizations. Environmental and Resource Economics , vol. 46, 2010, pp. 377-402. **Remark:** Application of IEA-theory to fisheries.

Rubio, S.J. and A. Ulph (2006), Self-enforcing International Environmental Agreements Revisited. “Oxford Economic Papers”, vol. 58(2), pp. 233-263. **Remark:** Further development of Barrett (1994).

Rubio, S.J. and A. Ulph (2007), An Infinite-horizon Model of Dynamic Membership of International Environmental Agreements. “Journal of Environmental Economics and Management”, vol. 54(3), pp. 296-310. **Remark:** One of the few models which do not apply the core and which are truly dynamic (dynamic payoff structure and stability is tested along the entire time path.)

de Zeeuw, A.J. (2008), Dynamic Effects on the Stability of International Environmental Agreements. “Journal of Environmental Economics and Management”, vol. 55(2), pp. 163-174. **Remark:** First attempt to combine membership and compliance aspects in one model.

If you need further references or want to discuss something, please contact me, room 222, or drop me an e-mail: m.finus@bath.ac.uk.